Do Tax Abatements  Impair  the Financing of Local Public Education by Wendling, Wayne R.
Upjohn Press Upjohn Press Collection 
1-1-1981 
Do Tax Abatements "Impair" the Financing of Local Public 
Education 
Wayne R. Wendling 
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Education Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Citation 
Wendling, Wayne R. 1981. Do Tax Abatements "Impair" the Financing of Local Public Education. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
Wayne R. Wendling
INSTITUTE The W. E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research

Do Tax Abatements
"Impair" 
the Financing
of Local 
Public Education
Wayne R. Wendling
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Copyright   1981
by the
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE 
FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH
300 South Westnedge Ave. 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
THE INSTITUTE, a nonprofit research organization, was established 
on July 1, 1945. It is an activity of the W. E. Upjohn Unemployment 
Trustee Corporation, which was formed in 1932 to administer a fund 
set aside by the late Dr. W. E. Upjohn for the purpose of carrying on 
"research into the causes and effects of unemployment and measures 
for the alleviation of unemployment."
The Board of Trustees
of the
W. E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trustee Corporation
Preston S. Parish, Chairman
Mrs. Ray T. Parfet, Vice Chairman
Charles C. Gibbons, Vice Chairman
D. Gordon Knapp, Secretary-Treasurer
E. Gifford Upjohn, M.D.
Mrs. Genevieve U. Gilmore
James H. Duncan
John T. Bernhard
The Staff of the Institute
E. Earl Wright, Director
Saul J. Blaustein
Judith K. Brawer
Phyllis Buskirk
H. Allan Hunt
John R. Mekemson
Carla J. Noe
Jo Bentley Reece
Robert A. Straits
Wayne R. Wendling
Jack R. Woods
in

Foreword
The Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development 
Districts Law of 1974 permits local communities in the state 
of Michigan to offer property tax abatements as in 
ducements for industry to locate there. This legislation also 
recognizes the fiscal interdependency between a municipality 
and its school district as they both utilize the same tax base. 
Whether the granting of a tax abatement impairs the financ 
ing of local public education is a most difficult question, 
however, because there are a number of complicating fac 
tors.
Because the question of impairment is likely to grow in im 
portance as financial pressures on both municipality and 
school district increase, the Institute is reprinting this study, 
which originally appeared as an article in Business Condi 
tions in the Kalamazoo Area. In this study, Dr. Wendling 
analyzes the interaction among the warranted and unwar 
ranted awarding of tax abatements, the formula for school 
operating aid from the state and alternate concepts of im 
pairment. It is published with the hope that the analysis in 
the paper will assist local policymakers to assess the 
ramifications of their actions on other taxing units.
Facts and observations expressed in this paper are the sole 
responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent 
positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research.
E. Earl Wright 
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan 
March 1981

Executive Summary
Any action that a municipal government takes that affects 
either the size of the property tax base or the flow of 
revenues from it is likely to affect the financing of local 
public education. The framers of the Michigan legislation 
permitting local communities to award tax abatements to 
new industrial developments and renovations of existing 
facilities recognized this interrelationship. They instructed 
governmental units awarding abatements to determine 
whether their action was "impairing the financial soundness 
of a taxing unit" (Section 207.559, Compiled Laws of 
Michigan). Local governments must carry out this fiduciary 
responsibility, however, even though the issue is complicated 
by (a) inconclusive evidence on the influence of tax 
abatements on the behavior of business and (b) the lack of 
an operational definition of impairment of financing local 
public education.
Whether the ability of Michigan school districts to finance 
local education has been adversely affected by the granting 
of tax abatements depends on the property wealth of the 
school district and on the state formula used to allocate 
operating aid. Districts on formula for state aid and taxing at 
a rate of $30 per $1,000 state equalized value (SEV) or less do 
not experience a change in spending for education between 
the granting or withholding of a tax abatement as long as 
their tax effort remains the same. Based on the 1979-80 for 
mula, spending could have varied between the abatement/no 
abatement alternative for districts on formula that expended 
a tax effort greater than 30 mills. Consequently, unwar 
ranted use of tax abatements directly affected potential 
spending or potential millage reductions in these districts. A 
change in the formula for 1980-81 eliminated this possibility. 
Districts off formula are most affected by the granting of tax
Vll
breaks. Exempted property represents foregone revenue 
which is not compensated by the aid formula. Furthermore, 
since the introduction of the gross revenue deduct of 
categorical aid, which is not neutral across districts, those 
districts barely off formula are likely to be affected relatively 
more than those whose SEV per pupil is substantially above 
the formula limit.
The long-run question of impairment hinges on the state 
aid formula reflecting the increasing costs of public services. 
If it does not, districts on formula will have no recourse but 
to increase their tax effort to provide the same level of real 
services, assuming no growth of the tax base. If a large pro 
portion of the tax base is exempted from property tax 
payments, increasing the tax millage on the nonexempt tax 
base could lead to the out-migration of firms and residents 
comprising the nonexempt base. Instead of real growth, the 
effective tax base could decline and the financial soundness 
of the taxing unit could be damaged. However, continued 
reliance on the state aid formula to forestall impairment is a 
poor substitute for a rational policy on the use of tax 
abatements.
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I. Introduction
Local public school districts rely on property tax revenues 
to finance their operations even more than cities and coun 
ties do. Any action that other governmental units take that 
affects either the size of the tax base or the flow of revenues 
from it, is likely to affect the financing of local elementary 
and secondary education. Whether an action damages the 
local education financing structure is not inevitable, 
however. For instance, it is frequently asserted, though the 
empirical results are inconclusive, that the need for 
municipalities to provide a broad range of noneducation 
public services may crowd out education spending, the 
municipal overburden problem. At issue here is whether two 
tax programs that local communities in the state of Michigan 
have used to generate increased local economic activity have 
adversely affected the local financing of public elementary 
and secondary education. 1
Both tax programs are designed to facilitate the ability of 
Michigan communities to compete with communities in 
other states for industrial and commercial developments. 
The Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development 
Districts Law of 1974 (PA-198) empowers local government 
units to establish plant rehabilitation and industrial develop 
ment districts and with state approval issue certificates which 
exempt replacement facilities or new facilities from the 
general property tax for up to a 12-year period and instead 
subject it to an industrial facilities tax. For replacement 
(restored, rehabilitated) facilities the industrial facilities tax
1. The Institute currently is involved in a conceptual study of local tax programs, their ef 
fectiveness at generating growth of the tax base, community investment goals and the in 
direct benefits and costs on industrial and commercial developments. A number of issues 
that logically could be raised here are dealt with in that study in order to limit the length of 
this discussion.
is imposed at the same rate as the property tax, but is applied 
to the state equalized value of the obsolete facility in the tax 
year preceding the certificate. For new facilities the in 
dustrial facilities tax is calculated by applying one-half of the 
local property tax to the state equalized value of the new 
facility. Act 255 of the Public Acts of 1978 expanded the 
creation of rehabilitation and development districts and the 
issuance of tax exemption certificates to include commercial 
property.
The potential impact of tax abatements on the financing 
of local public education in the state of Michigan was 
recognized in the framing of PA-198. It is stated that the 
city, county, township or village "shall set forth a finding 
and determination that the granting of the industrial 
facilities exemption certificate . . . shall not have the effect 
of substantially impeding the operation of the local govern 
mental unit or impairing the financial soundness of a taxing 
unit" (Section 207.559 Compiled Laws of Michigan). Since 
school districts are the prime competitors for the property 
tax dollar, conflicts have surfaced in some instances between 
the district and the unit of government utilizing the tax pro 
grams contending that the district©s ability to raise sufficient 
revenues is being damaged by the granting of abatements.
This article is organized in the following order. Section II 
is a discussion of the efficacy of tax abatements and alter 
native operational definitions of "impairment." Also in 
troduced are the concepts of inherent production technology 
and fiscal capacity. Both the most recent and the current 
state of Michigan operating aid for education formulae are 
presented in Section III. Both are analyzed because the im 
plications of each are different and, as a result, school 
districts that may have contended that their ability to finance 
education was being damaged may now view abatements as 
less harmful. The converse also may hold. The implications 
of each formula are demonstrated using hypothetical
districts. The specific situation for the nine school districts in 
Kalamazoo County is analyzed in Section IV. Additional 
considerations, including the issue of equity, are raised in 
Section V and the conclusions are presented in the final sec 
tion.
The focus of the paper is narrow. It concentrates on tax 
abatements, operating aid formulae, spending levels and 
changes in state equalized value (SEV). Factors that may be 
related to the question of impairment, but are not addressed, 
include (a) the other state funding formulae for schools and 
(b) other tax issues such as Headlee. Furthermore, only scant 
attention is paid to the potential service pressures on school 
districts resulting from new industrial and commercial 
developments, and declining enrollments.

II. What Constitutes Impairment?
Two major unknowns are associated with the question of 
the impact of tax abatements on local education finance. 
They are (a) the inconclusive evidence on the influence of tax 
abatements on the location and/or retention of firms and 
(b) the lack of an operational definition of impairment of 
financing local education. Perhaps these unknowns also are 
the basis of conflict that has emerged between those govern 
mental units awarding tax abatements and the local school 
district. Furthermore, in addition to the unknowns, both 
parties to the conflict are facing similar cost pressures and 
limits to raising revenues.
One purpose of local property tax exemptions can be to 
alter the competitive position of a community relative to 
others in order to attract or retain industry and commerce. 
Many studies, however, have relegated local taxes to a 
relatively unimportant role in influencing the location of in 
dustry (Schmenner, 1980). Other studies have determined 
that variations in local property taxes are a factor in the 
selection of a community for relocating manufacturing and 
wholesale establishments (Wasylenko, 1980). Because the 
evidence is inconclusive, and in the absence of some other 
agreed upon community goal for the use of tax abatements, 
the affected taxing units are likely to criticize the awarding of 
abatements as not being warranted.
Impair is the term used in PA-198, but there is no opera 
tional definition of impairment as it relates to soundness of 
the ability to finance local public education. Actions of local 
governmental units are going to affect the local school 
district. How much must they be affected before they are im 
paired? Consequently, governmental units do not have a 
guideline they can use to monitor the impact of their actions 
on other taxing units.
The problem created by the lack of an operational defini 
tion becomes more apparent as several possibilities are pro 
posed. Consider the following definition: the financial 
soundness of the local school district is not impaired by the 
granting of tax abatements as long as the school district is 
able to maintain the same spending level. This definition 
would be convenient and measurable. However, it also leads 
to the conclusion that impairment never takes place in the 
short run because tax abatements do not reduce the existing 
tax base. If the district maintains the same tax millage, it will 
be able to maintain the same level of spending. Thus, this 
definition is too simplistic in the short run and would suggest 
that no guideline is necessary.
An alternative definition could be based on the notion of 
adequacy of the spending level. If the district is able to spend 
above a predetermined "adequate" level, impairment is not 
an issue. It is, however, if granting tax abatements interferes 
with attaining this level. Not only does this necessitate deter 
mining what constitutes an adequate level, but it requires 
computing this for each district given that special needs of 
students and input prices of education resources factors af 
fecting the adequacy level also vary. Furthermore, to give 
the definition more than theoretical meaning, some districts 
currently must be spending less than an adequate amount. It 
also may raise questions about a state aid formula allowing 
districts to spend less than an adequate level. Thus, although 
the notion of adequacy may be part of a definition, it is not 
operational standing alone.
A definition based on millage might be an option. This is 
flawed because the relationship between a change in state 
equalized value and a change in the tax millage is not clear- 
cut, and may vary over the range of equalized values (the 
property tax base). For instance, voters may choose to raise 
millage as state equalized value (SEV) per pupil increases 
over the range of relatively low values of SEV per pupil, but
to decrease millage as SEV per pupil increases beyond a cer 
tain level. Given the way the operating aid formula in 
Michigan is structured, which is discussed in the next section, 
the only way a district "on formula" can spend more is to 
raise the tax millage; an increase in the property tax base will 
not lead to an increase in spending.
The school district can respond to an increase in SEV per 
pupil by either decreasing, increasing or not changing the tax 
millage. Because tax abatements affect the potential increase 
in SEV per pupil, they also may affect the school district©s 
choice of response regarding tax millage. To suggest that the 
inability to decrease tax millage is an impairment, as oppos 
ed to not being able to raise millage, requires a specific value 
judgment. To suggest the opposite also requires a specific 
value judgment. However, to suggest that both possibilities 
constitute impairment renders the definition superfluous 
because impairment of financial soundness would then be 
determined to occur whenever an abatement is awarded.
None of the above definitions is satisfactory. Either it is 
simplistic, arbitrary or subject to a series of qualifications. 
Each one, however, may constitute one aspect of impair 
ment. Another factor that may be incorporated is the ques 
tion of potential spending. For instance, if the tax millage re 
mains the same, how much could the district spend for 
education in the absence of tax abatements relative to what it 
could spend after they have been granted? This also is not 
satisfactory as a single measure since it applies to only one 
subset of districts. Consequently, all of these aspects will be 
incorporated into the analysis of the short term impact of tax 
abatements on the financing of local public education.
Finally, governmental units and school districts are facing 
similar cost pressures and limits to raising revenues. Conse 
quently, growth of the property tax base may be necessary 
for the continued provision of a constant level of public ser-
vices. The technology inherent in the production of some 
public services permits little improvement in productivity. 
The outputs of these services tend to be measured by the 
labor inputs and the potential to substitute capital for labor 
is limited (Baumol, 1967). 2 Education is one example. The 
output of education tends to be measured by the pupil- 
teacher ratio which is really an input measure. Increasing this 
ratio raises the output (number of students taught) of each 
teacher, but the quality of instruction is defined as decreas 
ing. Because quality constant productivity improvements are 
very limited, the cost of providing these services will increase 
through time as wages rise (Baumol; Spann, 1977). Without 
growth of the property tax base, the same level of public ser 
vices will consume a greater portion of the revenues. 
Revenues, however, cannot be increased simply by raising 
taxes on the existing base because the fiscal capacity of a 
community©s businesses and residents is limited. Fiscal 
capacity is the maximum amount of revenue attainable by 
the taxing unit from its tax base and residents (Akin and 
Auten, 1976). Stated differently, fiscal capacity is the max 
imum tax liability that can be imposed without leading to the 
net out-migration of businesses and residents. It tends to be a 
function of the size of the property tax base (standardized
2. The actual constraint may not be in the technology of production, but in the technology 
of measuring output, outcomes or quality. Attempts to arrive at single measures of quality 
or quantity are dismissed as inadequate because schools have a variety of goals: teaching a 
certain amount of academic skills, socializing students, creating appropriate attitudes 
toward work and authority, and preparing students to enter the job market. A frequently 
used single measure is the achievement test score. There has been considerable controversy 
over its use, but it does provide a quantitative standard for the outcome and change in out 
come. Breakthroughs are being made in the technology of measuring education outcomes 
that may permit the development of productivity measures and the discarding of the pupil- 
teacher ratio. Researchers are determining which characteristics of teachers, administrators 
and schools lead to improvements in achievement for students with specific attributes and 
home backgrounds. Examples include: (a) students whose achievement level initially was 
relatively low demonstrated greater improvement with less experienced teachers (Summers 
and Wolfe, 1977); (b) male teachers were more effective than females, with stronger impact 
in math than in reading (Murnane, 1975); and (c) reading score improvement was greater 
using the linguistic basal approach than other techniques (Summers, 1979).
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for residents or pupils), the base©s distribution among in 
dustrial, commercial and residential sectors and the income 
of residents. Thus, units of government will attempt to 
generate growth of the tax base and to increase local 
economic activity.

III. A General Analysis of the Michigan 
Operating Aid Formula
The basic formula for distributing operating school aid in 
Michigan is a combination of minimum level foundation and 
district power equalizing plans. The details of the formula 
have changed for the 1980-81 school year relative to what 
they were for the 1979-80 school year. Both are presented 
because each highlights different aspects of whether districts 
have been harmed by the granting of tax abatements and 
under what conditions. Mathematically, operating aid to the 
district for each student enrolled (member) in the school 
district is:
State Operating Aid Per Pupil = X + M(P-Pj) 
where X is per pupil foundation level of the aid for 
mula, 
M is the number of mills of tax effort by the
district, 
P is the power of each mill of tax effort
guaranteed by the state, and 
Pj is the power of each mill of tax effort in the 
particular school district.
The foundation is a fixed amount per pupil which serves as 
the basis for the formula and is not dependent on local tax 
effort. However, it is not a flat grant to each district irrespec 
tive of property wealth since the power equalizing compo 
nent can erase the foundation level of support. The district 
power equalizing element attempts to compensate for dif 
ferences in property tax bases across communities by 
equalizing the revenue yield (power) of each unit of tax ef 
fort (millage). The power of the tax effort indicates the 
revenue generated from the property tax base by one mill of 
tax effort.
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Districts with relatively low levels of property wealth per 
pupil receive relatively greater amounts of state operating aid 
whereas districts above a certain level receive no operating 
aid they are "off formula." The state share of operating 
expenditures for local public education has been approx 
imately 38 percent. Local district revenues provide approx 
imately 56 percent of the operating funds and the federal 
share is 6 percent.
The district power equalizing formula has a number of im 
plications for those districts "on formula." First, once a 
district©s voters select a tax millage, variations in SEV per 
pupil will not result in a change in spending per pupil in that 
district. Second, the only way a district on formula can 
change the level of spending is to adjust its tax effort. Third, 
this formula provides an incentive for a district to levy a 
higher tax millage because the amount of state aid received 
per pupil by the district is greater as the tax millage is increas 
ed, holding all other things constant. Finally, an increase in 
the number of students to be served by the school district, 
assuming that SEV and tax millage remain the same, will 
result in greater aid per pupil in addition to increased aid due 
to the additional pupils.
These features can be clarified by referring to Table I, 
which lists the level of state aid per student, local revenues 
per student and spending per pupil (for operating purposes) 
for districts whose SEV per pupil ranges from $20,000 to 
$75,000. 3 The formula utilized is that for the 1979-80 school 
year. During that school year, the foundation support was 
$325 per student. The state equalized the revenue yield at 
$43.00 for each tax mill levied up to 30 and at $21.50 for 
each mill beyond 30. Districts that levied a tax of $30 per
3. The equalizing nature of the formula is demonstrated by the proportion of spending 
derived from state aid decreasing from 62.85 percent to 7.12 percent as the SEV increases 
from $20,000 to $50,000.
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Table I 
State Operating Aid, Local Revenues and Total Spending
per Pupil for the 1979-80 School Year 
for Hypothetical School Districts in Michigan
State equalized 
value per pupil
$20,000 ..........
25,000..........
30,000..........
35,000..........
40,000..........
43,000..........
45,000..........
50,000 ..........
53,833..........
55,000..........
60,000 ..........
65,000..........
70,000 ..........
75,000..........
State operating 
aid per pupil
$1,015
865
715
565
415
325
265
115
0
0
0
0
0
0
Local revenue 
per pupil
$ 600
750
900
1,050
1,200
1,290
1,350
1,500
1,615
1,650
1,800
1,950
2,100
2,250
Total spending 
(operating) per pupil
$1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,615
1,650
1,800
1,950
2,100
2,250
Percent aid 
of spending
62.85
53.56
44.27
34.98
25.70
20.12
16.41
7.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
NOTE: Based on the following assumptions:
Tax Rate = $30 per $1,000 SEVPP
Operating Aid Formula = $325 + .030($43,000 - SEVPPj)
Local Revenue =.030(SEVPPj)
SEVPP: = State equalized value per pupil in the i district
$1,000 of state equalized value the measure of the property 
tax base and whose SEV per pupil was less than $53,833 
received some state operating aid and were able to spend 
$1,615 per child for operating purposes through the com 
bination of state aid and local revenues. School districts with 
SEV equal to $43,000 per pupil received state aid of $325 per 
enrolled pupil.
Consider the first implication: assuming a specific tax 
millage, variations in SEV per pupil simply alter the ratio of 
state aid to local revenues in the composition of the level of 
spending. Initially consider the district whose SEV per pupil 
is $35,000. It is levying a millage of 30 mills per $1,000 of 
SEV per pupil. Local revenue is $1,050 per pupil and state 
aid is $565 per pupil. State aid per pupil is computed by add 
ing $325 (the foundation level) and the product of the 
millage times the difference between the state©s 
"guaranteed" tax base ($43,000) and the local district©s tax 
base, both of which are measured on a per pupil basis. Total 
spending from these two sources is $1,615 per pupil. If SEV 
per pupil decreases to $30,000 and the tax millage remains 
the same, operating aid per pupil increases to $715, local 
revenue decreases to $900 per pupil, but spending remains 
constant. Aid as a percent of spending increases from 34.98 
percent to 44.27 percent. Thus, once the voters of a district, 
which is on formula, have selected a tax millage, variations 
in SEV per pupil will not result in a change in spending per 
pupil.
The second feature follows directly from the formula: ad 
justments in the tax effort can change the base amount of 
spending that the formula assures. If in the operating aid 
formula listed at the bottom of the table, the lower millage 
of .025 is substituted for .030, and the SEV per pupil is 
$35,000, the level of spending will change. This district will 
receive less, only $525 in operating aid ($325-I-$200), will 
raise less, only $875 in local revenues, and will spend less,
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only $1,400 per pupil. It has been determined from the 
previous case that if the tax millage is 30 mills, the spend 
ing level is $1,615. Thus, the only way a district on formula 
can adjust its level of spending is to change its tax effort. The 
incentive to level a greater millage follows directly from the 
previous examples. Recall that if the tax millage is 25 mills 
and SEV per pupil is $35,000, operating aid per pupil is $525 
per pupil; but aid increases to $565 per pupil if the tax effort 
is 30 mills.
Finally, consider the implication concerning an increase in 
the number of students. Initially, assume that SEV is $40 
million and that there are 1,000 pupils. SEV per pupil is 
$40,000 and, given the conditions listed in Table I, operating 
aid per pupil is $415. If 183 pupils are added to the member 
ship roster, and SEV remains the same, the SEV per pupil of 
the district decreases approximately to $35,000. Operating 
aid increases to $565 per pupil for 1,183 pupils whereas 
previously the district received $415 per pupil for 1,000 
students. The converse holds if membership declines; 
operating aid per pupil is reduced and is received for fewer 
pupils.
Table I also will be used to analyze whether tax 
abatements have impaired financing of local education. 
Throughout this analysis two caveats hold. First, it is assum 
ed that school districts are financially sound at the start of 
the time period under consideration. Second, the findings 
apply only to one time period, the current one. No attempt is 
made in this section to determine what the long-run impact 
of granting a tax abatement will be nor what is the 
cumulative influence of all the abatements that have been 
granted previously.
Initially consider a district with SEV equal to $35,000 per 
pupil. It receives state aid of $565, generates $1,050 from 
local revenues and spends $1,615 per pupil. Assume that a
15
new industrial development is contemplated that could add 
$10,000 to SEV per pupil. If no abatement is granted and the 
firm decides to go through with the project, SEV increases to 
$45,000 per pupil, state aid per pupil decreases to $265, but 
local revenue per pupil increases to $1,350. Total spending is 
$1,615 per pupil. However, as an inducement, the local com 
munity offers the firm contemplating the development an 
abatement that establishes an industrial development district 
and sets the taxable value at one-half of its equalized value. 
The project then adds only $5,000 per pupil to the effective 
SEV for the school district, SEV per pupil increases to 
$40,000, state aid per pupil is $415, local revenue per pupil is 
$1,200 and total spending is $1,615 per pupil. 4 Thus, in this 
situation any increase in SEV is matched by a decline in state 
aid, with the result that spending remains the same.
Next, consider the case of a district that is off formula, 
i.e., its SEV per pupil is greater than $53,833. Assume that 
its SEV is $55,000 per pupil, it is levying a tax of $30 per 
$1,000 of SEV and that a firm is contemplating a develop 
ment that would add $10,000 per pupil to SEV, $5,000 per 
pupil if an abatement is granted. Using Table I again, if the 
development takes place and no abatement is granted, SEV 
increases to $65,000 per pupil and $1,950 of local revenues 
per pupil are raised from the tax effort. Granting an abate 
ment reduces the potential increase to $60,000 SEV per 
pupil, which generates local revenues of $1,800 per pupil for 
education. If the development does not take place, local 
revenues raised per pupil remain at $1,650.
4. In fact, an industrial facilities tax is levied on the development. Proceeds from the tax 
are turned over to the district in relation to its usual tax levy. The result is identical to an in 
crease in SEV for school taxing purposes. These values are used only for analytical conve 
nience. A project would have to have a state equalized value of $140 million in order to add 
$10,000 per pupil in Kalamazoo. For Schoolcraft, the project would need to add $8.9 
million to the state equalized value.
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Granting a tax abatement has no impact in this time period 
on the district "on formula." Assuming tax effort would not 
have changed, spending remains the same. The district "off 
formula" potentially could have increased spending by a 
substantial amount if the abatement is not granted, the 
development occurs and it maintains the same tax effort. 
Conversely, if the abatement is the key factor, the district 
could increase spending or reduce tax effort as a result of it 
being awarded. Thus, although there does not appear to be a 
conclusive argument for impairment, the importance of the 
effectiveness of tax abatements in answering this question 
becomes more evident.
The question of whether $1,615, the base amount, is an 
adequate level of spending for operating purposes also is a 
factor. If the base level is recognized as adequate to provide 
a reasonable quality of education, then the issuance of an 
abatement could not be considered to impair the ability to 
finance education in this time period. If $1,615 is not an ade 
quate level, then impairment becomes more of a reality 
whenever an abatement is granted that does not meet an 
agreed upon community goal. It could be argued that since 
the state formula does not fully equalize millage above .030, 
the state formula implicitly recognized $1,615 as an adequate 
level of spending for operating purposes. However, since the 
formula does not require a minimum effort of 30 mills, it 
could be suggested that the state formula makes no state 
ment about minimum or adequate levels of spending.
A new industrial or commercial development also has im 
plications for the supply of public services. The investment 
may lead to the in-migration of households with additional 
children that need to be served by the public schools. The 
resulting cost pressures could vary among school districts. 
For instance, school districts with excess capacity due to 
declining enrollments may be able to operate more efficiently 
with additional pupils. Although total cost will increase, the
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average cost of each student may drop in such a district. 
Other districts that are operating at capacity may be strained 
by an influx of students. Thus, although the state grants 
operating aid for each student, the additional cost of serving 
new students could vary markedly across districts.
An important feature of the 1979-80 operating aid for 
mula is that the power of the tax effort was equalized fully 
only to 30 mills. Millage above this level was equalized at 
one-half the rate. Table II addresses the impairment issue for 
districts whose tax effort was greater than 30 mills. Consider 
the district whose SEV per pupil is $30,000 and whose 
millage is .040. As indicated in Table II, the district receives 
$780 in aid, provides $1,200 of its own revenue for each 
pupil and spends $1,980 per pupil. Assume the choice used 
earlier: a development adding $10,000 to SEV per pupil with 
no abatement or $5,000 to SEV per pupil with a tax abate 
ment. Although the district is on formula, the outcomes dif 
fer. Under the former case, aid is reduced to $430 per pupil, 
local revenue increases to $1,600 and total spending per pupil 
is $2,030. If a tax abatement is granted, state aid is relatively 
greater, local revenue is relatively less, but total spending per 
child is $2,005, which is less than in the no abatement situa 
tion. Thus, districts exerting a tax effort greater than 30 mills 
are affected by the granting of abatements because the dif 
ference between the abatement/no abatement action, assum 
ing the development takes place, is not fully compensated. 
Therefore, these districts have a greater interest in 
abatements being offered only when they are the marginal 
(critical) determinant. For districts off formula, the case is 
analogous to the one discussed in relation to Table I.
According to PA-198 and PA-255, tax exemptions also 
can be given to existing firms that revitalize and/or expand 
existing structures to make them more viable economically. 
Tax abatements in this instance freeze property taxes at their 
pre-renovation level. Is there a differential impact when the
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Table II 
State Operating Aid, Local Revenues and Total Spending
per Pupil for the 1979-80 School Year 
for Hypothetical School Districts in Michigan
State equalized 
value per pupil
$20,000 ..........
25,000..........
30,000 ..........
35,000..........
40,000 ..........
43,000..........
45,000..........
50,000 ..........
52,286..........
55,000..........
60,000 ..........
65,000..........
70,000 ..........
75,000..........
State operating 
aid per pupil
$1,130
955
780
605
430
325
255
80
0
0
0
0
0
0
Local revenue 
per pupil
$ 800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,720
1,800
2,000
2,091
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
3,000
Total spending 
(operating) per pupil
$1,930
1,955
1,980
2,005
2,030
2,045
2,055
2,080
2,091
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
3,000
Percent aid 
of spending
58.55
48.85
39.39
30.17
21.18
15.89
12.41
3.85
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
NOTE: Based on the following assumptions:
Tax Rate = $40 per $1,000 SEVPP
Operating Aid Formula = $325 + .030($43,000 - SEVPPj) + (.050)(.010)($43,000 - SEVPPj)
Local Revenue =.040(SEVPPj)
SEVPPj = State equalized value per pupil in the i th district
major thrust of tax policy is toward existing structures? For 
purposes of discussion, assume that a community establishes 
a rehabilitation zone in the central city and all rehabilitations 
in that area automatically qualify for a tax abatement. Fur 
thermore, assume that the district is taxing itself at a rate of 
$40per$l,OOOSEV.
From Table II it can be seen that this case differs 
somewhat from the one in which there is a new development. 
Assume that the district is at $30,000 SEV per pupil and that 
planned rehabilitations could raise it to $40,000. Instead, all 
planned rehabilitations receive tax abatements which freeze 
the effective tax base for school districts at the previous 
level. Although state aid does not decrease to $430 from $780 
per pupil, total spending does not increase either. What is 
missing is that halfway point: the district gets no loaf instead 
of a half loaf. However, the service pressure on the school 
district is likely to be less than in the new development case 
because the potential for families moving in and, therefore, 
additional school age children needing to be served, pro 
bably is much less.
The state of Michigan has altered its school operating aid 
formula for the 1980-81 school year. Two major changes 
have been made. First, the formula fully equalizes the power 
of the tax effort for every mill levied, including those over 
30. Second, if the district©s SEV per pupil is greater than the 
no aid level, $58,133, the district incurs a reduction in 
categorical aid received under a number of other programs. 5 
Thus, a link has been established between the operating aid 
and categorical aid formulae. The excess local revenue, 
which is called the gross revenue deduct, is used to calculate 
the amount that is deducted from the district©s receipts for
5. Categorical aid refers to state aid that is designated for specific categories of programs or 
recipients. Examples could include aid for vocational education, special education, and, in 
some instances, transportation. This differs from operating aid which can be used as the 
district wishes for any operational purposes.
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several categorical aid programs, but the reduction is not 
greater than 50 percent of the total categorical aid received 
through these programs. Other changes to the formula in 
clude increasing (a) the foundation aid to $357 per pupil and 
(b) the power of each tax mill to $46.24 per pupil. As a 
result, the base figure expenditure per pupil, assuming a 
millage of .030, has risen to $1,744.20, compared to $1,615 
under the prior formula.
The operation of the gross revenue deduct is displayed in 
Table III. Consider the district whose SEV per pupil is 
$60,000. At a millage of .030, $1,800 per pupil is raised local 
ly. Given that the base spending figure is $1,744.20, the 
potential revenue deduct is $55.80 per pupil. If the district 
receives $200 per pupil in categorical aid under the applicable 
programs, aid under these categoricals can be reduced by the 
full amount of the revenue deduct, $55.80 per pupil. 
However, if the district©s SEV per pupil is $70,000, yielding 
revenue of $2,100 per pupil or $355.80 above the base 
amount, the categorical aid of $200 is reduced (recaptured) 
by only $100 per pupil. The reduction may not exceed 50 per 
cent of the affected categorical aid. It should be noted that 
the $200 per pupil example used here for categorical aid may 
not bear any relation to the actual aid amounts received for 
these programs. 6
6. The use of per pupil figures to reflect the potential recapture of categorical aid 
understates the magnitude of the effect. For example, a district with 3,000 students and a 
gross revenue deduct of $55.80 per pupil would lose over $167,000 in categorical aid. Fur 
thermore, the local district involvement in categorical programs may vary according to the 
size of the district. Larger districts may have a sufficient number of pupils in the special 
programs to make it feasible to run their own programs rather than through the in 
termediate districts. Thus, a larger district may spend proportionately more of its own 
funds for its own program than a smaller district even though they have the same SEV per 
pupil. Given that state aid to these programs has been approximately $.30 of each dollar, 
the recapture results in larger districts spending proportionately a still greater amount on 
these programs than smaller districts. Thus, the impact may not be neutral across districts 
of equal SEV per pupil.
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Table III
State Aid for Education and Local Revenue Given the Operating Aid Formula 
for the 1980-81 School Year for Hypothetical School Districts in Michigan
State equalized 
value per 
pupil
$20,000 ...........
25,000 ...........
30,000 ...........
35,000 ...........
40,000 ...........
45,000 ...........
46,240 ...........
50,000 ...........
55,000 ...........
58,133 ...........
60,000 ...........
65,000 ...........
70.000 ...........
State Total 
operating Local spending 
aid per revenue (operating) 
pupil per pupil per pupil
$1,144.20 $ 
994.20 
844.20 
694.20 
544.20 
394.20 
357.00 
244.20 
94.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
o.oo ;
600 $ 
750 
900 
,050 
,200 
,350 
,387.20 
,500 
,650 
,744 
,800 
,950
1. 100 ;
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,744.20 
,800.00 
,950.00 
> 100.00
Percent 
aid of 
spending
65.60 
57.00 
48.40 
39.80 
31.20 
22.60 
20.47 
14.00 
5.40 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00
Categorical 
aid per 
pupil
$200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200
Revenue 
deduct 
per pupil
$ 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55.80 
205.80 
355.80
Aid 
recaptured 
by state 
per pupil
$ 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55.80 
100.00 
100.00
NOTE: Based on the following assumptions:
Tax Rate = $30 per $1,000 SEVPP
Operating Aid Formula = $357+ (.030)($46,240 - SEVPPj)
Gross Revenue Deduct (GRD) = If SEVPPj>$58,333, then GRD = (0.30)(SEVPP; - $58,333) }(.50)(CA)
SEVPPj = State equalized value per pupil in the i district
CA = Categorical Aid
What is the impact of local tax abatement programs on the 
disbursement of state aid in accordance with the new for 
mula? Referring back to Table III, consider the district 
whose SEV per pupil is $55,000 and levies a tax millage of 
.030. Total spending per pupil is $1,744.20, including $94.20 
in state aid. Assume that a new development is considering 
locating in the community that will raise the SEV to $65,000 
per pupil if no abatement is granted or to $60,000 with a tax 
abatement. In either case the district will go off formula, but 
it now will be liable for a revenue deduct against the 
categorical aid. If no abatement is granted, and the tax effort 
does not change, local revenues will increase to $1,950 per 
pupil but the district loses half its categorical aid, the reduc 
tion amounting to $100 per pupil. Assuming that $100 of 
operating revenues per pupil goes to make up the loss in 
categorical aid, effective spending is $1,850 per pupil. If the 
tax abatement is granted, the categorical aid reduction of 
$55.80 per pupil will reduce effective local spending per pupil 
to $1,744.20, the same as the base figure. Thus, even though 
the abatement will increase the tax base, spending per pupil 
will not change.
The district described above one that is almost off for 
mula faces an unusual alternative: no increase in the tax 
power if the abatement is the marginal determinant to a 
potential development and it is not granted; no increase if 
the abatement is granted; and a considerable increase in the 
power of the tax effort if no abatement is granted and it is 
not the marginal determinant. Districts with relatively 
greater property wealth still face the earlier no loaf, half 
loaf, full loaf alternative because of the constraint placed on 
the amount of the aid recapture.
Districts whose property wealth (SEV) per pupil is less 
than $58,133 per pupil could be relatively indifferent be 
tween the granting or not granting of a tax abatement 
because any gain in the tax base is matched by a loss in state
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aid, irrespective of the millage levied. This differs from the 
previous formula in which districts levying a millage above 
.030 were not fully equalized and therefore, directly affected 
by the awarding of abatements in nonmarginal situations. 
Those districts facing the biggest dilemma given the new for 
mula are those just off formula. Although they are still 
guaranteed the base amount, they are not made relatively 
better off by additions to the tax base, whereas those 
substantially above that level find that they can benefit from 
either a small or large addition to SEV. Thus, the administra 
tion of local tax policy by the municipality is likely to be 
most controversial and difficult when the local school 
district is just off formula.
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IV. The Situation for Kalamazoo 
County School Districts
School districts in Kalamazoo County cover the range of 
hypothetical possibilities discussed in the previous section. 
For the 1979-80 school year, four of the nine districts levied 
an operating millage over 30 mills, three levied a millage 
substantially below 30 mills, one©s millage was approximate 
ly 30 mills and only one of the districts was off formula. In 
1980-81 again, only one district is off formula. The millage 
levied for operating purposes ranges from 24.93 to 36.30 
mills. The data for school districts in Kalamazoo County are 
presented in Table IV. 7
The three hypothetical cases discussed earlier can be 
classified as (a) districts on formula, (b) districts off formula 
and (c) districts on formula whose tax levy is not fully 
equalized. The granting of tax abatements affects each set of 
districts differently.
The districts of Climax-Scotts, Galesburg-Augusta, Gull 
Lake, Schoolcraft and Vicksburg in 1979-80 all were on for 
mula and for the 1979-80 school year levied a millage of 30 
mills or less. Therefore, in that time period, abatements that 
added only one-half of the increase in SEV to the property 
tax were fully equalized and spending for operating purposes 
was not affected. These districts also are on formula for the 
1980-81 school year and again the new operating aid formula 
equalizes for the "lost" SEV.
The Comstock school district is the only one that is off the 
operating aid formula. Its SEV per pupil exceeds the 1980-81
7. The data presented in Table IV have been collected from the local school districts. The 
same set of data also was gathered from the Michigan Department of Education. In almost 
all cases there is some discrepancy between the data from the two sources and, as a result, 
this table may not be identical to one developed from state published sources.
25
Table IV 
Data on Financing for School Districts Located in Kalamazoo County
Number of students Operating millage State Equalized Value
State Equalized Value 
per student
School district 1979-1980 1980-1981 1979-1980 1980-1981 1979-1980 1980-1981 1979-1980 1980-1981
Climax-Scotts .. 787 751 22.0584
Comstock...... 2,747 2,728 30.5500
Galesburg-
Augusta..... 1,438© 1,412 2 28.6128
Gull Lake ...... 2,812 2,758 24.7500 3
Kalamazoo City. 14,181 13,758 36.1000
Parchment..... 1,987 1,909 31.2588
Portage........ 9,194 8,794 31.8600
^ Schoolcraft..... 890 892 29.9960
<^ Vicksburg ...... 2,782_____2,686____25.5491
SOURCE: Contacts with the offices of school districts involved.
1. Includes 50 in adult education.
2. Includes 66 in adult education.
3. 23.9400 levied.
4. 31.9 authorized.
29.5000
30.5500
28.8160
24.9300
36.3000
31.2588 4
32.2000
29.3000
30.0000
5 27,292,359
164,547,307
40,649,687
111,819,427
661,127,781
69,716,881
362,932,261
36,877,567
97,782,655
$ 29,796,033 
178,418,879
46,835,096
130,621,362
716,028,940
77,591,974
415,600,604
41,237,616
111,456,779
$34,680 
59,901
28,268
39,765
46,621
35,087
39,475
41,435
35,148
$39,675 
65,403
33,169
47,361
52,045
40,645
47,260
46,231
41,495
no aid level, which is $58,133, by a relatively small amount. 
Therefore, it is the only district in the county subject to the 
gross revenue deduct. In 1980-81 the district©s tax levy raises 
$1,998 per pupil for operating purposes. This value, 
however, is not equivalent to total spending per pupil 
because federal and state categorical aids still provide some 
support to the district.
The expected dollar loss in categorical aid for 1980-81 is 
not available at this time. Proxy figures for 1978-79 are 
available which indicate that the district spent $131 per pupil 
for "added/needed" programs and in this same year they 
received $109 per pupil from state sources. For purposes of 
discussion, assume that for 1980-81 the Comstock district 
was again scheduled to receive $109 per pupil in categorical 
aid. The excess revenue generated given the millage and SEV 
is $228 per pupil, of which $54.50 per pupil is subject to 
recapture. Therefore, additions to the SEV will not lead to a 
greater gross revenue deduct. Thus, this change to the 
method of financing schools should have no appreciable im 
pact on the deliberations on whether to grant tax abatements 
in Comstock.
The districts of Kalamazoo, Parchment and Portage have 
been affected most by the change in the operating aid for 
mula between the 1979-80 and 1980-81 school years. These 
districts have levied millage in excess of 30 mills and, as a 
result, during the 1979-80 school year spending for operating 
purposes could have differed depending on the decision to 
grant or not to grant an abatement. This was the case 
because mills in excess of 30 were equalized at one-half the 
power. Therefore, although these districts© financial sound 
ness in this time period probably was not impaired, 
abatements granted that were not the marginal consideration 
or did not further some other community goal, affected the 
potential spending or tax millage of these districts.
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The 1980-81 operating aid formula altered the equaliza 
tion of tax millage above 30 mills, thereby removing this 
source of potential conflict. Therefore, if the criterion is 
used that, in the current time period, the ability to finance 
education has not been impaired if there is no difference in 
spending between the abatement/no abatement situations, 
eight of the nine districts have not been impaired. The one 
district that falls outside this criterion, Comstock, is off for 
mula, which implies that it has greater capacity than 
necessary to finance education, assuming other factors are 
the same.
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V. Other Considerations
Perhaps the most troublesome issue is the long run impair 
ment of financing local education. Suppose the base amount 
per pupil is adequate in the current time period, but that the 
state aid formula does not keep pace with the increase in 
costs due to no productivity growth in future years. Districts 
will have no recourse but to increase their tax effort in order 
to finance the same level of real services in the future, assum 
ing no growth in the tax base. However, the increase in tax 
will be borne primarily by residents and firms not having any 
property exempted. In turn, higher millage rates could cause 
some out-migration of firms and residents, thereby exacer 
bating the situation. Districts off formula must continue to 
rely on growth of the tax base or increased tax rates to pro 
vide the necessary revenues. The decision alternatives have 
not changed for units of government making abatement 
decisions in off-formula districts since they have not been 
able to rely on the formula to compensate for the potential 
revenues. The full impact of decisions has not been 
mitigated.
Earlier the concept of fiscal capacity was discussed. Fiscal 
capacity is the maximum revenue that can be generated by 
the local community from its tax base without inducing out- 
migration. The district power equalizing formula is designed 
to equalize for fiscal capacity differences. However, it is bas 
ed on districts making the same tax effort, independent of 
the SEV. For example, if the maximum local tax effort that 
does not overburden the taxpayer is directly related to the 
property wealth per pupil of the district, the impact of the 
decision to grant a tax abatement differs among districts by 
the SEV per pupil of the district. Suppose that the maximum 
tax effort by a district with SEV per pupil of $20,000 is 20 
mills, whereas it is 30 mills for a district with SEV per pupil
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of $30,000. Under the current formula the first district 
would spend $1,281.80 per student and the second district 
would spend $1,744.20. State operating aid would be 
$881.80 and $844.20, respectively.
Assume the prospect of a development that would add 
$10,000 to SEV per pupil in the first district. The usual com 
parison would indicate that spending would remain at 
$1,281.80, but the share of state aid would decrease. If the 
new development increases incomes and leads to the in- 
migration of people having a greater taste for education, it is 
possible that the tax effort would increase, say to 30 mills. 
Total spending per pupil would then increase to $1,744.20. 
Thus, the district would not be indifferent between the alter 
natives. However, it is possible that local effort could 
decrease with an increase in wealth since a desired (target) 
level of spending could be reached with a lower millage. As 
indicated earlier, neither case can be considered an "impair 
ment" because any decision rule based on millage, in the 
short run, requires a normative judgment.
Kleine (1979) stated that units of government granting tax 
abatements were distributed unevenly through the state. 
Specifically, PA-198 had a higher rate of usage in 
Southwestern Michigan than elsewhere. Since a tax abate 
ment usually results in greater operating aid for a school 
district than would occur in the absence of an abatement, 
assuming it is not the marginal determinant, and since state 
operating aid tends to come out of general funds collected 
throughout the state, communities granting abatements may 
be receiving an implicit subsidy from the rest of the state.
Finally, equity also is a consideration. With respect to the 
public education of children, one notion of equity suggests 
that children should be treated equally, but it recognizes that 
some pupils require additional services. One method of 
measuring the equity of education is to examine spending
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patterns. Approximately equal spending is an indication of 
equity, except that greater spending is required to compen 
sate for differences in the needs of students or the prices of 
education resources. Thus, if this notion of equity is ac 
cepted, the analysis of whether a district©s ability to finance 
services has been impaired must consider more than the level 
of spending. It is possible that although two districts spend 
approximately the same amount per pupil and have approx 
imately equal SEV per pupil above the no aid level, a situa 
tion that promises no growth of the effective tax base may 
represent an impairment to the district that has many 
students requiring special services.
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VI. Conclusions
Has the ability of Michigan school districts to finance 
local education been adversely affected by the granting of 
tax abatements for industrial and commercial projects ac 
cording to either PA-198 or PA-255? The answer differs by 
school district and through time depending on the state for 
mula used to allocate operating aid. Analysis of this issue is 
difficult, however, because (a) the evidence on the effec 
tiveness of tax abatements at inducing growth of the tax base 
is inconclusive and (b) there is no operational definition of 
impairment of the financial soundness.
According to the analysis, districts on formula for state 
aid and taxing at a rate of $30 per $1,000 SEV or less do not 
experience a change in spending for education between the 
granting or withholding of a tax abatement. This holds as 
long as there is no relationship between tax effort and SEV, 
i.e., their tax effort remains the same. Based on the 1979-80 
formula, spending did vary between the abatement/no 
abatement alternative for districts on formula that expended 
a tax effort greater than 30 mills. Potential spending per 
pupil was greater with a "full loaf" rather than with a "half 
loaf" even though both led to greater spending than "no 
loaf." Consequently, unwarranted use of tax abatements 
directly affected potential spending or potential millage 
reductions in these districts. A change in the formula for 
1980-81 eliminated that possibility. Districts off formula are 
most affected, although not necessarily impaired, by the 
granting of tax breaks. Exempted property represents 
foregone revenue; but with the gross revenue deduct ap 
plicable to categorical aid in the current year, the impact is 
not neutral across districts. Districts barely off formula are 
likely to be affected relatively more than districts whose SEV 
per pupil is substantially above the formula limit.
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It does not appear that, in the present time period, tax 
abatements have impaired the financial soundness of most 
school districts. This conclusion is based on the assumption 
that school districts are financially sound at the start of the 
time period. No attempt is made to look at the cumulative 
impact of previous abatements. In the long run, the question 
of impairment hinges on the state aid formula reflecting the 
increasing costs of public services. If it does not, districts on 
formula will have no recourse but to increase their tax effort 
to provide the same level of real services, assuming no 
growth of the tax base. Exempting a large share of the tax 
base from property tax payments could lead to the increased 
tax effort exceeding the fiscal capacity of the nonexempt tax 
base, which in turn would be manifested by the out- 
migration of firms and residents. Instead of real growth, the 
effective tax base would decline and the financial soundness 
would be adversely impacted. However, continued reliance 
on the state aid formula to forestall impairment is a poor 
substitute for a rational policy on the use of tax exemptions.
Districts off formula are a separate issue. When districts 
on formula are able to provide only the base amount for 
operating purposes, it is difficult to conceive that districts 
off formula (by a significant margin) have had their ability 
to provide education services damaged by tax abatements. 
However, the new state aid operating formula with the 
recapture of categorical aid will place a greater burden on 
these districts such that impairment may become an issue if 
tax exemptions are granted when not warranted.
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